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EFFICIENT ASYNCHRONOUS ACCUMULATORS FOR
DISTRIBUTED PKI
SOPHIA YAKOUBOV
ABSTRACT
Cryptographic accumulators are a tool for compact set representation and secure set
membership proofs. When an element is added to a set by means of an accumulator, a
membership witness is generated. This witness can later be used to prove the membership
of the element. Typically, the membership witness has to be synchronized with the accu-
mulator value, and to be updated every time another element is added to the accumulator.
In this work we propose an accumulator that, unlike any prior scheme, does not require
strict synchronization.
In our construction a membership witness needs to be updated only a logarithmic
number of times in the number of subsequent element additions. Thus, an out-of-date
witness can be easily made current. Vice versa, a verifier with an out-of-date accumulator
value can still verify a current membership witness. These properties make our accumulator
construction uniquely suited for use in distributed applications, such as blockchain-based
public key infrastructures.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptographic accumulators, first introduced by Benaloh and DeMare [3], are compact
binding (but not necessarily hiding) set commitments. Given an accumulator, an element,
and a membership witness (or proof ), the element’s presence in the accumulated set can be
verified. Membership witnesses are generated upon the addition of the element in question
to the accumulator, and are typically updated with every subsequent addition. Membership
witnesses for elements not in the accumulator are computationally hard to find.
A trivial accumulator construction simply uses digital signatures. That is, when an
element is added to the accumulator, it is signed by some trusted central authority, and
that signature then functions as the witness for that element. However, this solution is
very limited, since it requires trust in a central authority (in other words, it is not strong
as defined in Chapter 2).
There are many applications of cryptographic accumulators. These can mostly be di-
vided into localized applications, where a single entity is responsible for proving the mem-
bership of all the elements, and distributed applications, where many entities participate
and each entity has interest in (or responsibility for) some small number of elements. In
this paper, we focus on distributed applications, which were the original motivation for
accumulators [3].
Our New Accumulator One significant problem with accumulators in the context of
distributed applications is that all existing constructions require that membership witnesses
be updated every time a new element is added into the accumulator. If elements are added
2to the accumulator at a high rate, having to perform work linear in the number of new
elements in order to retain the ability to prove membership can be prohibitively expensive.
In this work, we introduce a new strong accumulator construction which requires only
a logarithmic amount of work (in the number of subsequent element additions) in order
to keep a witness up to date. Unlike any prior construction, our accumulator construction
also supports the verification of an up-to-date witness against an outdated accumulator,
enabling verification by parties who are offline and without access to the most recent
accumulator. Our construction is made even more well suited for distributed applications
by the fact that it does not require any additional storage for the execution of accumulator
updates. Chapter 3 describes our construction in detail, and provides comparisons to prior
constructions.
Applications The original distributed applications proposed by Benaloh and DeMare [3]
involved a canonical common state, but did not specify how to maintain it. Public append-
only bulletin boards, such as the ones implemented by bitcoin [13] and its alternatives
(altcoins, such as namecoin [14]), provide a place for this common state. Bitcoin and
altcoins implement this public bulletin board by means of block chains; in bitcoin they are
used primarily as transaction ledgers, while altcoins extend their use to public storage of
arbitrary data.
Altcoins such as namecoin can be used for storing identity information in a publicly
accessible way. For instance, they can be used to store (IP address, domain) pairs, enabling
DNS authentication [18]. They can also be used to store (identity id, public key pk) pairs,
providing a distributed alternative to certificate authorities for public key infrastructure
(PKI) [19].
Elaborating on the PKI example, when a user Bob registers a public key pkBob, he adds
the pair (“Bob”, pkBob) to the bulletin board. When Alice needs to verify Bob’s public
key, she could look through the bulletin board to find this pair. However, when executed
naively, this procedure would require Alice to read the entire bulletin board—i.e., a linear
3amount of data. Bob can save Alice some work by sending her a pointer to the bulletin
board location where (“Bob”, pkBob) is posted; however, that would still require that Alice
have access to a linear amount of data during verification. What if Alice doesn’t have
access to the bulletin board at the time of verification at all, or wants to reduce latency by
avoiding on-line access to the bulletin board during verification?
Our accumulator construction can be used in this setting to free Alice from the need
for on-line random access to the bulletin board [19] (see also [10] for a similar use of accu-
mulators). It allows her to instead simply download a small amount of data from the end
of the bulletin board at pre-determined (perhaps infrequent) intervals. The accumulator
would contain all of the (id, pk) pairs on the bulletin board, with responsibility for the
witnesses distributed among the interested individuals. When Bob posts (“Bob”, pkBob) to
the bulletin board, he also adds (“Bob”, pkBob) to the accumulator, and stores his witness
wBob. He posts the updated accumulator to the bulletin board, and since our accumulator
construction is trapdoor-free and deterministic, the validity of the new accumulator can be
checked by all parties simply by re-adding (“Bob”, pkBob) to the old accumulator. Details
of how such posts are monitored and validated can be found in [19].
Then, when Alice wants to verify that pkBob is indeed the public key belonging to
Bob, all she needs is wBob and a locally cached accumulator value. As long as Bob’s
bulletin board post pre-dates Alice’s locally cached accumulator value, Alice can use that
accumulator value and wBob to verify that (“Bob”, pkBob) has been posted to the bulletin
board. She does not need to refer to any of the new bulletin board contents, because in our
scheme (as opposed to other accumulator schemes), an up-to-date witness can be used for
verification even against an outdated accumulator (as long as the addition of the element
in question pre-dates the accumulator).
Our construction also reduces the work for Bob, as compared to other accumulator
constructions. In a typical accumulator construction, Bob needs to update wBob every
time a new (id, pk) pair is added to the accumulator. However, in a large-scale PKI, the
number of entries on the bulletin board and the frequency of element additions can be
4high. Thus, it is vital to spare Bob the need to be continuously updating his witness. Our
accumulator reduces Bob’s burden: Bob needs to update his witness only a logarithmic
number of times. Moreover, Bob can update his witness on-demand—for instance, when he
needs to prove membership—by looking at a logarithmic number of bulletin board entries
(see Section 3.2 for details).1
1The question of whether accumulators updates can be batched, as in our scheme, was first posed by
Fazio and Nicolosi [9] in the context of dynamic accumulators (i.e., accumulators that support deletions
as described in Chapter 2). It was answered in the negative by Camacho [4], but only in the context of
deletions, and only in the centralized case (when all witnesses are updated by the same entity).
Chapter 2
Definitions
As described in the introduction, informally, a cryptographic accumulator is a compact
representation of a set of elements which supports proofs of membership. In this chapter, we
provide a more thorough description of accumulators, their algorithms and some properties
which may be desired of them.
A basic accumulator construction consists of four polynomial-time algorithms Gen, Add,
MemWitUpOnAdd and VerMem, described below. Various flavors of these algorithms have
been restated in literature a number of times. They were first introduced in Baric and
Pritzmann’s [2] formalization of Benaloh and DeMare’s [3] seminal work on accumula-
tors, and a more general version was provided by Derler, Hanser and Slamanig [8]. We
present them slightly differently: we model all potential input and output parameters more
explicitly, and we categorize the algorithms by their intended executor.
For convenience, we enumerate and explain all of the input and output parameters here:
• k: the security parameter.
• sk: the accumulator manager’s secret key or trapdoor. (The corresponding public
key, if one exists, is not modeled here as it can be considered to be a part of the
accumulator itself.)
• t: a discrete time / operation counter.
• at: the accumulator at time t.
• mt: any auxiliary values which might be necessary for the maintenance of the ac-
6cumulator. These are typically held by the accumulator manager. Note that while
the accumulator itself should be constant (or at least sub-linear) in size, m may be
larger.
• x, y: elements which might be added to the accumulator.
• wxt : the witness that element x is in accumulator at at time t.
• upmsgt: a broadcast message sent (by the accumulator manager, if one exists) at
time t immediately after the accumulator has been updated. This message is meant
to enable all entities to update the witnesses they hold for consistency with the new
accumulator. It will often contain the new accumulator at, and the nature of the
update itself (e.g. “x has been added and witness wxt has been produced”). It may
also contain other information.
We separate the accumulator algorithms into (1) those performed by the accumulator
manager if one exists, (2) those performed by any entity responsible for an element and
its corresponding witness (from hereon-out referred to as witness holder), and (3) those
performed by any third party. Parameters which are omitted in some schemes are in grey.
Algorithms performed by the accumulator manager:
• Gen(1k)→ (sk, a0,m0) instantiates the accumulator a0 (representing the empty set),
the auxiliary value m0 necessary for the maintenance of the accumulator, and the
accumulator manager’s secret key sk.
• Add(sk, at,mt, x)→ (at+1,mt+1, wxt+1, upmsgt+1) adds the element x to the accumu-
lator.
Note that accumulator constructions where Gen and Add are deterministic and do not
use sk are also verifiable, meaning that an execution of Gen or Add can be carried out by
anyone, and verified by any third party in possession of the inputs simply by re-executing
7the algorithm and checking that the outputs match. In such a case, an accumulator man-
ager is not necessary, since Gen and Add can be executed by the (possibly untrusted)
witness holders and verified as needed.
Algorithms performed by a witness holder:
• MemWitUpOnAdd(x,wxt , upmsgt+1) → wxt+1 updates the witness for element x after
an element y is added to the accumulator. upmsgt+1 might contain any subset of
{wyt+1, at, at+1, y}, as well as other parameters.
Algorithms performed by any third party:
• VerMem(at, x, wxt )→ b ∈ {0, 1} verifies the membership of x in the accumulator using
its witness.
Now that we have defined the basic functionality of an accumulator, we can describe
the properties an accumulator is expected to have. Informally, the correctness property
requires that for every element in the accumulator a it should be easy to prove membership,
and the soundness (also referred to as security) property requires that for every element
not in the accumulator a it should be infeasible to prove membership.
Correctness An accumulator is correct if an up-to-date witness wx corresponding to value
x can always be used to verify the membership of x in an up-to-date accumulator a.
More formally, for all security parameters k, all values x and additional sets of values
[y0, . . . , yi−1], [yi+1, . . . , yn]:
Pr

(sk, a0,m0)← Gen(1k);
(at+1,mt+1, w
yt
t+1, upmsgt+1)← Add(sk, at,mt, yt) for t ∈ [0, . . . , i− 1];
(ai+1,mi+1, w
x
i+1, upmsgi+1)← Add(sk, ai,mi, x);
(at+1,mt+1, w
yt
t+1, upmsgt+1)← Add(sk, at,mt, yt) for t ∈ [i + 1, . . . , n];
wxt+1 ← MemWitUpOnAdd(x,wxt , upmsgt+1) for t ∈ [i + 1, . . . , n] :
VerMem(an+1, x, w
x
n+1) = 1

= 1
8Soundness An accumulator is sound (or secure) if it is hard to fabricate a witness w for
a value x that has not been added to the accumulator.
More formally, for all security parameters k, for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A with black-box access to a Add oracle on accumulator a, it holds that:
Pr

(sk, a0,m0)← Gen(1k);
(x,w)← AAdd(1k, a0,m0);
Add has not been called on x :
VerMem(a, x, w) = 1

≤ negl(k)
Where negl is a negligible function in the security parameter, x is an element A has
not called Add on, and a is the accumulator after the adversary made all of his calls to
Add.
In addition to correctness and soundness, there are a number of properties that might
be needed from an accumulator, depending on the application it is being used for. Some
of these (e.g. dynamism, universality and strength) have been introduced over the years as
interesting additional properties, while others (e.g. full distribution, low update frequency
and old-accumulator compatibility) are new in this paper.
Constant Size The trivial accumulator construction would have the accumulator consist
of a list of all elements it contains. However, this is not at all space-efficient. Ideally,
accumulators should remain small no matter how many items are added to them. An
accumulator is constant-size if its size (as well as the size of the witnesses created for it) is
independent of the number of elements it contains.
It should be noted that there are solutions (e.g. [5], as well as the construction presented
in this work) in which the accumulator and its witnesses grow logarithmically. While these
are not constant size, they are still interesting in many applications.
Dynamism In 2002, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [6] introduced the notion of dynamic
accumulators, which support the deletion of elements from the accumulator. Deletions
9can, of course, be performed simply be generating a new accumulator and re-adding all
the elements which have not been deleted. This takes a polynomial amount of time in the
number of elements, and so is, strictly speaking, efficient. However, a dynamic accumulator
should support deletions in time which is either independent of the number of elements
altogether, or is sublinear in the number of elements. A dynamic accumulator has the
following additional algorithms:
• Del(sk, at,mt, x)→ (at+1,mt+1, upmsgt+1) (executed by the accumulator manager, if
one exists) deletes the element x from the accumulator.
• MemWitUpOnDel(x,wxt , upmsgt+1) → wxt+1 (executed by a witness holder) updates
the witness for element x after y is deleted from the accumulator.
Unlike Fazio and Nicolosi [9], we present MemWitUpOnDel and MemWitUpOnAdd as two
separate algorithms, because in all of the existing accumulator constructions the mechanism
by which the update is performed is very different for deletions and additions.
Universality In 2007, Li, Li and Xue [11] introduced the notion of universal accumulators,
which are accumulators that support non-membership proofs as well as membership proofs.
For distinction, we let w denote a membership witness and u denote a non-membership
witness. A universal accumulator has the following additional algorithms:
• NonMemWitCreate(sk, at,mt, x, (upmsg1, . . . , upmsgt)) → uxt (executed by an accu-
mulator manager or any third party) generates a non-membership witness uxt for
x.
• VerNonMem(at, x, uxt ) → {0, 1} (executed by any third party) verifies the nonmem-
bership of x in the accumulator using its non-membership witness uxt .
• NonMemWitUpOnAdd(x, uxt , upmsgt+1) → uxt+1 (executed by a witness holder) up-
dates the non-membership witness for element x after y is added to the accumulator.
If the accumulator is dynamic as well as universal, it also has the following algorithm:
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• NonMemWitUpOnDel(x, uxt , upmsgt+1) → uxt+1 (executed by a witness holder) up-
dates the non-membership witness for element x after y is removed from the accu-
mulator.
A universal accumulator should additionally be undeniable (as named by Lipmaa, [12]),
meaning that it should be infeasible to prove the membership and non-membership of the
same element.
Strength In 2008, Camacho, Hevia, Kiwi and Opazo [5] introduced the notion of strong
accumulators, which are accumulators that do not assume that the accumulator manager
is trusted. Strong accumulator manager protocols are all publicly verifiable, enabling any
third party to verify that the accumulator manager did not cheat. One way to achieve
this is to eliminate the use of trapdoor information in the creation or maintenance of the
accumulator; that is, the parameter sk should be absent from all accumulator algorithms.
Full Distribution We consider an accumulator to be fully distributed if there is no party
(including the accumulator manager, if one exists) which must store an amount of informa-
tion that is linear or super-linear in the number of elements in the accumulator. That is,
the parameter m (if it exists) must be sub-linear in size. (Note that all other parameters
are already assumed to be sub-linear.)
Low Update Frequency We consider an accumulator to have a low update frequency if
the frequency with which a witness for element x needs to be updated is sub-linear in the
number of elements which are added after x.
Old Accumulator Compatibility We consider an accumulator to be old accumulator
compatible if up-to-date witnesses wxt can be verified even against an outdated accumulator
at′ where t
′ < t, as long as x was added to the accumulator before t′. Note that this does
not compromise the soundness property of the accumulator, because if x was not a member
of the accumulator at t′, wxt does not verify with at′ . Old accumulator compatibility allows
the verifier to be offline and out of sync with the latest accumulator state.
Chapter 3
Our New Scheme
There are several known accumulator constructions, including the RSA construction [3,
6, 11], the Bilinear Map construction [15, 7, 1], and the Merkle tree construction [5].
Their properties are described in Figure 3.1. None of these constructions have low update
frequency or old-accumulator compatibility. The construction given in [5], which is similar
to ours in that both are based on Merkle trees, is made more complicated and somewhat
less efficient by the fact that it is designed it to be universal. We present a different
Merkle tree construction which, unlike the construction given in [5], is fully distributed,
old-accumulator compatible and saves on update frequency, but is not universal.
3.1 Construction
Let n be the number of elements in our accumulator, and let h be a collision-resistant hash
function. (When h is applied to pairs or elements, the pair is encoded in such a way that
it can never be confused with a single element x – e.g., a pair is prefaced with a 1, and a
single element with a 0.)
The accumulator maintains a list of D = dlog(n + 1)e elements r0, . . . , rD (as opposed
to just one Merkle tree root). The element ri is the root of a complete Merkle tree
with 2i leaves if and only if the ith least significant bit of the binary expansion of n is 1.
Otherwise, ri = ⊥. A witness wx for x is the authenticating path for x in the Merkle tree
1Refer to Section 3.3 for details.
2Sander [17] shows a way to make the RSA accumulator strong by choosing the RSA modulus in such
a way that its factorization is never revealed.
3Here a and d refer to the number of elements added and deleted after the addition of the element whose
witness updates are being discussed.
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Accumulator Protocol Runtimes and Storage Requirements
Accumulator Signatures RSA Bilinear Map Merkle This Work
Add runtime 1 1 1 w/ trapdoor, log(n) log(a)
n without
Add storage 1 1 1 w/ trapdoor, n log(a)
n without
MemWitUpOnAdd runtime 0 1 1 log(n) log(a)
MemWitUpOnAdd storage 0 1 1 log(n) log(a)
NonMemWitUpOnAdd runtime − 1 1 log(n) −
NonMemWitUpOnAdd storage − 1 1 log(n) −
Del runtime − 1 1 log(n) log(a)
Del storage − 1 1 n log(a) (with
additional
inputs) 1
MemWitUpOnDel runtime − 1 1 log(n) log(a)
MemWitUpOnDel storage − 1 1 log(n) log(a)
NonMemWitUpOnDel runtime − 1 1 log(n) −
NonMemWitUpOnDel storage − 1 1 log(n) −
Accumulator Properties
Accumulator Signatures RSA Bilinear Map Merkle This Work
Accumulator size 1 1 1 1 log(a)
Witness size 1 1 1 log(n) log(a)
Dynamic? no yes yes yes yes (with
additional
inputs)
Universal? no yes yes yes no
Strong? no no2 no yes yes
Fully distributed? yes yes yes no yes
Update frequency 3 0 a+ d a+ d a+ d log(a) + d
Old accumulator compatibile? yes no no no yes
Figure 3.1: Various accumulator constructions and their protocol runtimes, stor-
age requirements, and properties. For each algorithm of Add, MemWitUpOnAdd,
NonMemWitUpOnAdd, Del, MemWitUpOnDel, and NonMemWitUpOnDel, the table
gives the algorithm runtime, and the storage required for the algorithm execution.
Additionally, the table describes other accumulator properties, such as accumulator
size, witness size, dynamism, universality and strength. We let n denote the total
number of elements in the accumulator, a denote the number of elements added to
the accumulator, and d denote the number of elements deleted from the accumulator.
The RSA Construction is due to [3, 6, 11]. The Bilinear Map construction is due to
[15, 7, 1]. The Merkle tree construction is due to [5]. Big-O notation is omitted from
this table in the interest of brevity, but it is implicit everywhere.
that contains x. That is, wx = ((z0, dir0), . . . , (zd, dird−1)), where each zi is in the range of
the hash function h, and each dir is either right or left. These are the (right / left) sibling
elements of all of the nodes along the path from element x to the accumulator root of depth
d. An illustration of an accumulator a and a witness w is given in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: An illustration of our accumulator. The accumulator itself is shaded; the
unshaded elements are elements of the Merkle trees which are not actually a part
of the accumulator. The elements with dashed outlines belong to the authenticating
path for xt+2 (which itself has a bold outline). So, the witness for xt+2 would be
wxt+2 = ((h(xt+3), left), (z, right)).
Verification is done by using the authenticating path wx and the element x in question
to recompute the Merkle tree root and check that it indeed matches the accumulator
element rd, where d is the length of w
x. In more detail, this is done by recomputing the
ancestors of the element x using the authenticating path wx as described in Algorithm 1,
where the ancestors are the nodes along the path from x to its root, as defined by x and by
elements in wx. If the accumulator is up to date, the last ancestor should correspond to the
appropriate accumulator element rd. If the accumulator is outdated but still contains x,
one of the recomputed ancestors should still correspond to one of the accumulator elements.
Verification is described in full detail in Algorithm 5 of Appendix 4.
Element addition is done by merging Merkle trees to create deeper ones. Specifically,
when the nth element x is added to a = [r0, . . . , rD], if r0 = ⊥, we set r0 = h(x). If,
however, r0 6= ⊥, we “carry” exactly as we would in a binary counter: we create a depth-
one Merkle tree root z = h(h(x), r0), set r0 = ⊥, and try our luck with r1. If r1 = ⊥, we
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can set r1 = z. If r1 6= ⊥, we must continue merging Merkle trees and “carrying” further
up the chain. Element addition is described in full detail in Algorithm 3 of Appendix 4.
Membership witness updates need to be performed only when the root of the Merkle tree
containing the element in question is merged, or “carried”, during a subsequent element
addition. This occurs at most D times. Membership updates use the update message
upmsgt+1 = (y, w
y
t+1) (where y is the element being added and w
y
t+1 is the witness generated
for y) in order to bring the witness wxt for the element x up to date, as described in
Algorithm 4 of Appendix 4.
Properties This construction is trivially correct. It is sound as long as h is collision
resistant. Soundness can be proven using the classical technique for Merkle trees: if an
adversary A can find a witness for an element that has not been added to the accumulator,
then A can be used to find a collision for h.
This construction is strong, since every operation is deterministic and publicly verifi-
able. It is also fully distributed; all storage requirements are logarithmic in the number of
elements. No auxiliary storage m (as described in Chapter 2) is necessary for accumulator
updates.
Section 3.2 discusses the membership witness update frequency of the construction;
Section 3.3 discusses how the construction can be modified to support a limited notion of
dynamism.
3.2 Infrequent Membership Witness Updates
As highlighted in Section 3.1, this accumulator scheme requires that the witness for a
given element x be updated at most D = dlog(n + 1)e times, where n is the number
of elements added to the accumulator after x. One might observe that having to check
whether the witness needs updating each time a new element addition occurs renders this
point moot, since this check itself must be done a linear number of times. However, we can
get around this by giving our witness holders the ability to “go back in time” to observe
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past accumulator updates. If they can ignore updates when they occur, and go back to the
relevant ones when they need to bring their witness up to date (e.g. at when they need to
show it to a verifying third party), they can avoid looking at the irrelevant ones altogether.
“Going back in time” is possible in the public bulletin board setting of many distributed
applications. Recall the application from Chapter 1, in which our accumulator is main-
tained as part of a public bulletin board. The bulletin board is append-only, so it contains
a history of all of the accumulator states. Along with these states, we will include the
update message, and a counter indicating how many additions have taken place to date.
Additionally, we will include pointers to a selection of other accumulator states, so as to
allow the bulletin board user to move amongst them efficiently. The pointers from accumu-
lator state t would be to accumulator states t− 2i for all i such that 0 < 2i < t (somewhat
similarly to what is done in a skip-list). These pointers can be constructed in logarithmic
time: there is a logarithmic number of them, and each of them can be found in constant
time by using the previous one, since t − 2i = t − 2i−1 − 2i−1. Note that storing these
pointers is not a problem, since we are already storing a logarithmic amount of data in the
form of the accumulator and witness.
Our witness holder can then ignore update messages altogether, performing no checks
or work at all. Instead, he updates his witness only when he needs to produce a proof.
When this happens, he checks the counter of the most recently posted accumulator state.
The counter alone is sufficient to deduce whether his witness needs updating. If his witness
does not need updating, he has merely performed a small additional constant amount of
work for the verification at hand. If, as happens a logarithmic number of times, his witness
does need updating, the pointers and counters allow him to locate in logarithmic time the
(at most logarithmic number of) bulletin board entries he needs to access in order to bring
his witness up to date, as described in Algorithm 9 of Appendix 4. Thus, the total work
performed by our witness holder will remain logarithmic in the number of future element
additions.
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3.3 Limited Dynamism
We can make our accumulator construction dynamic by giving the accumulator manager
auxiliary storage m consisting of the leaves of the Merkle trees (i.e., the set of elements
in the accumulator). Then, to perform a deletion Del, the manager replaces the leaf in
the tree corresponding to x with ⊥, updates the ancestors of this leaf, and broadcasts
the updated ancestors of ⊥ as the update message upmsg. To perform a witness update
MemWitUpOnDel (upon receipt of upmsg), each witness holder whose value x is in the same
Merkle tree replaces one node on its path (namely, the child node of the lowest common
ancestor of the deleted value and x) with the corresponding value from upmsg.
This modification degrades the space efficiency of the manager by adding auxiliary
linear storage on top of the very short (logarithmic) accumulator, thus compromising full
distribution. (We note that this extra storage can be avoided if the witness holder, or
perhaps several other cooperating witness holders, can provide the necessary portions of
the Merkle tree to the manager when needed. However, this would only truly work if
withdrawing an element from the accumulator was a voluntary act—for instance, this
would not work in the application of credential revocation.) This modification will also
degrade the low update frequency property, and old accumulator compatibility.
To keep both full distribution and low update frequency, we can limit deletions to
newer elements (e.g. an element can only be deleted within a constant number of turns
of being added), since newer elements are in the small trees. While this appears to be
limiting, it should be noted that in many applications, deletions of older elements may
be avoided altogether by wrapping “time to live stamps” or “expiration dates” into the
elements themselves.
Chapter 4
Appendix 1: Algorithms
In this appendix, we give the pseudocode for all of the algorithms used in our accumulator
scheme. A Python implementation of these algorithms is available upon request.
4.1 Accumulator Algorithms
In this section, we give the pseudocode for the basic accumulator algorithms, such as Gen
(Algorithm 2), Add (Algorithm 3), MemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm 4) and VerMem (Algo-
rithm 5). Recall that h is a hash function.
Algorithm 1 GetAncestors: a helper function for MemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm 4) and
VerMem (Algorithm 5).
Require: p, x
1: c = h(x)
2: p = [c]
3: for (z, dir) in p do
4: if dir = right then
5: c = h(c||z)
6: else if dir = left then
7: c = h(z||c)
8: append c to p
9: return p
Algorithm 2 Gen
Require: 1k
1: return a0 = ⊥
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Algorithm 3 Add
Require: at, x
1: at+1 = at (the new accumulator starts out as a copy of the old one)
2: wxt+1 = [] (the witness starts out as an empty list)
3: d = 0 (the depth of the witness starts out as 0)
4: z = h(x)
5: while at+1[d] 6= ⊥ do
6: if the length of at+1 < d + 2 then
7: append ⊥ to at+1
8: z = h(at+1[d]||z)
9: append (at+1[d], left) to w
x
t+1
10: at+1[d] = ⊥
11: d = d + 1
12: at+1[d] = z
13: return at+1, w
x
t+1, upmsg = (x,w
x
t+1)
Algorithm 4 MemWitUpOnAdd
Require: y, wyt+1, w
x
t
1: let dxt be the length of w
x
t
2: let dyt+1 be the length of w
y
t+1
3: if dyt+1 < d
x
t then
4: return wxt (the witness has not changed)
5: else
6: dxt+1 = d
y
t+1
7: wxt+1 = w
x
t (the new authenticating path starts out as a copy of the old one)
8: wyt+1 = GetAncestors(w
y
t+1, y)
9: append (wyt+1[d
x
t ], right) to w
x
t+1
10: append wyt+1[d
x
t + 1, . . . ] to w
x
t+1
11: return wxt+1
Algorithm 5 VerMem
Require: at, x, w
x
1: p = GetAncestors(wx, x)
2: if at and r have any elements in common (computable in linear time) then
3: return TRUE
4: else
5: return FALSE
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4.2 Batch Witness Updates
In this section, we give the pseudocode for the algorithms which allow our witness holder
to avoid reading to every update message, and instead do only a logarithmic amount of
work upon every verification in order to bring the witness up to date. In the following
algorithms, we assume the existence of a public append-only random access bulletinboard.
bulletinboard[ptr] gives the ptrth entry of bulletinboard. However, since bulletinboard may
be used for things other than accumulator entries, the ptrth entry of bulletinboard is
not guaranteed to correspond to the ptrth accumulator update. Instead, we let t′ =
bulletinboard[ptr].t denote the timestep t′ such that the ptrth entry of bulletinboard cor-
responds to the t′th accumulator update. GetPointers (Algorithm 6) and GetPointer (Algo-
rithm 7) are helper algorithms for creating the pointers and using them to move amongst
the entries of bulletinboard which are relevant to the accumulator.
Let i be the number of irrelevant entries on bulletinboard after the last relevant entry,
and let n be the number of elements which have been added to the accumulator. GetPointers
(Algorithm 6), which finds the pointer to include in a new bulletin board entry, takes O(i)+
O(log(n)) time. (The O(i) is present because GetPointers finds the newest accumulator
bulletinboard entry by iterating over the entries of bulletinboard backwards.) Similarly,
GetPointer (Algorithm 7), which finds a pointer to a desired bulletin board entry given
another pointer at which to start, takes O(log(n)) time.
BatchMemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm 9), the batch witness update algorithm itself, also
takes O(log(n)) time. BatchMemWitUpOnAdd reverses the list of relevant indices before
finding the pointers to them for reasons of efficiency. This way, the total number pointers
followed is O(log(n)), and not O(log(n)2). The list of relevant pointers is then reversed
again, so as to perform the actual membership witness updates in order.
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Algorithm 6 GetPointers: finds all the pointers needed for a new accumulator update
bulletin board entry. If the accumulator update happens at timestep t, the pointers should
be to all accumulator updates at timesteps t − 2i for i such that 0 < 2i < t. This is a
helper function for BatchMemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm 9).
Require: the bulletin board bulletinboard
1: ptrs = []
2: find the last occurring addition entry (lt, alt, y, w
y
lt) on bulletinboard.
3: if one does not exist then
4: return ptrs
5: let lptr be the pointer to the last entry
6: append lptr to ptrs
7: exp = 1
8: stuck = FALSE
9: while not stuck do
10: lptr = ptrs[−1] (the last element of ptrs)
11: let numPointersAtLastPointer be the number of pointers stored at bulletinboard[lptr]
12: if numPointersAtLastPointer < exp then
13: stuck = TRUE
14: else
15: ptr = bulletinboard[lptr].ptrs[exp− 1]
16: append ptr to ptrs
17: exp = exp + 1
18: return ptrs
Algorithm 7 GetPointer: finds a pointer to the bulletin board entry corresponding to the
t∗th accumulator update. This is a helper function for BatchMemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm
9).
Require: the bulletin board bulletinboard, the timestep t∗, and a pointer ptr to a bulletin
board entry corresponding to t′ ≥ t∗
1: t′ = bulletinboard[ptr].t
2: while t′ 6= t∗ do
3: difference = t′ − t∗
4: let exp be the largest exponent such that 2exp is smaller than difference
5: ptr = bulletinboard[ptr].ptrs[exp]
6: t′ = bulletinboard[ptr].t
7: return ptr
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Algorithm 8 GetUpdateTimeSteps: finds the timesteps at which a witness needs to be
updated. This is a helper function for BatchMemWitUpOnAdd (Algorithm 9).
Require: the bulletin board bulletinboard, the timestep lupt at which the last witness
update occurred, the timestep lt at which the last accumulator update occurred, and
the depth d of the witness in question
1: relevantTimeSteps = []
2: power = 2d
3: t = lupt + power
4: while t ≤ lt do
5: append t to relevantTimeSteps
6: while t mod power × 2 = 0 do
7: power = power ∗ 2
8: t = t + power
9: return relevantTimeSteps
Algorithm 9 BatchMemWitUpOnAdd
Require: the bulletin board bulletinboard, the witness wx, and the timestep lupt at which
wx was last updated
1: let d be the length of wx
2: find the last occurring addition entry (lt, alt, upmsg = (y, w
y
lt)) on bulletinboard, and let
ptr be the pointer to this entry
3: relevantTimeSteps = GetUpdateTimeSteps(lupt, lt, d)
4: reverse the order of relevantTimeSteps
5: relevantPointers = []
6: for t ∈ relevantTimeSteps do
7: ptr = GetPointer(bulletinboard, t, ptr)
8: append ptr to relevantPointers
9: reverse the order of relevantPointers
10: for ptr ∈ relevantPointers do
11: get (t, at, upmsg = (y, w
y
t )) using ptr from bulletinboard
12: wx = MemWitUpOnAdd(y, wyt , w
x)
13: return wx
Chapter 5
Appendix 2: Prior Work
The tables in Figure 3.1 summarize the properties of the RSA, Bilinear Map and Merkle
tree constructions, as well as our construction presented in Chapter 3.
Existing constructions can be divided into two flavors: those based on quasi-commutative
hash functions, and those based on Merkle trees.
5.1 Quasi-Commutative Hash Function Constructions
Benaloh and de Mare [3] proposed constructing accumulators from quasi-commutative hash
functions, which are hash functions h : A×X → A such that, for all a ∈ A and x, y ∈ X,
it holds that
h(h(a, x), y) = h(h(a, y), x).
Since order does not matter in the application of this hash function, we let h(a, {x1, x2, . . . , xn})
denote h(h(. . . h(h(a, x1), x2) . . .), xn).
An accumulator can be built by starting with a given a ∈ A, and applying h repeatedly
as values xi are added to the set. If h is one-way, then membership of a value xi in the set
can be tested in the accumulator a = h(a, {x1, . . . , xn}) given a witness w = h(a, {xj}j 6=i)
by checking that h(w, xi) = a. This is clearly correct; if the value xi was legitimately added
to a, a valid w = h(a, {xj}j 6=i) would have been maintained. It is also sound; since h is
one-way, values w and x 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn} such that h(w, x) = a would be hard to obtain.
The RSA and Bilinear Map accumulators are both based on different quasi-commutative
hash functions.
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The RSA Accumulator Exponentiation in Z∗n, where the factorization of n is unknown, is
one-way and quasi-commutative, and can be used to construct a cryptographic accumulator
as described above. This can be done simply by using h(a, x) = av(x) mod n, where v be
a collision-resistant hash function. This construction was introduced in [3], and proven
secure under the strong RSA assumption in [2].
Note that this construction only remains secure as long as the factorization of n is
not known to the adversary; that is, the factorization of n is a trapdoor. However, this
trapdoor is only necessary to create the accumulator, not to use the accumulator; the
Add, MemWitUpOnAdd and VerMem algorithms can all be carried out without knowing the
factorization of n. So, while the RSA accumulator is not a strong accumulator because Gen
uses trap-door information, it can be made strong by performing Gen differently, e.g. via
multi-party computation, or via the factorization-oblivious sampling technique described
in [17].
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [6] give a way to make the RSA accumulator dynamic.
They constrain the hash function v to the domain of prime numbers; they then describe
a deletion algorithm Del and an additional witness update algorithm MemWitUpOnDel.
Del(a, x) is computed simply by finding a′ = av(x)−1 mod φ(n) mod n, while MemWitUpOnDel
(where x is being deleted from y’s witness w) involves finding the Bezout coefficients b and
c such that bv(x) + cv(y) = 1, and computing w′ = wcab mod n. Note that Del requires
the knowledge of the trap door, just like Gen; however, MemWitUpOnDel does not.
Li, Li and Xue [11] give a way to make the RSA accumulator universal; to prove that
an element x is not in the accumulator, you simply show that x and the current accumu-
lator exponent are relatively prime. The details, which also utilize Bezout coefficients, are
omitted.
The Bilinear Map Accumulator Nguyen [15] proposed a dynamic accumulator con-
struction based on bilinear maps. The one-way, quasi-commutative hash function used is
modular exponentiation by x + sk, where sk is a secret value. Briefly, the accumulator
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value for a set of elements S is a = g
∏
x∈S(x+sk), and a witness w for an element x is a
value such that e(w, gx+sk) = e(a, g).
Many of the techniques that can be applied to the RSA accumulator to give it additional
properties such as dynamism and universality can also be applied to the bilinear map
accumulator, but with respect to polynomials as opposed to integers.
5.2 Merkle Tree Construction
Camacho, Hevia, Kiwi and Opazo [5] proposed constructing universal accumulators in
a way similar to the building of Merkle trees. By hashing together elements which are
lexicographic neighbors and using those as their hash tree leaves, they support proofs of
non-membership; to prove that an element x is not in the accumulator, simply prove that
the hash tree has a node of the form h(x1, x2), where x1 < x < x2.
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